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Abstract 
 
 
We document widespread ex post changes to the historical contents of the I/B/E/S analyst stock 
recommendations database. Across a sequence of seven downloads of the entire I/B/E/S 
recommendations database, obtained between 2000 and 2007, we find that between 6,594 (1.6%) 
and 97,579 (21.7%) of matched observations are different from one download to the next. The 
changes, which include alterations of recommendation levels, additions and deletions of records, 
and removal of analyst names, are non-random in nature: They cluster by analyst reputation, 
brokerage firm size and status, and recommendation boldness. The changes have a large and 
significant impact on the classification of trading signals and back-tests of three stylized facts: 
The profitability of trading signals, the profitability of changes in consensus recommendations, 
and persistence in individual analyst stock-picking ability. 
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Data are the bedrock of empirical research in finance. When there are questions about the accuracy 
or completeness of a data source, researchers routinely go to great lengths to investigate 
measurement error, selection bias, or reliability.1 But what if the very contents of a historical 
database were to change over time? Such changes to the historical record would have important 
implications for empirical research. They could undermine the principle of replicability, which in 
the absence of controlled experiments is the foundation of empirical research in finance. They could 
result in over- or underestimates of the magnitudes of empirical effects, leading researchers down 
blind alleys. And to the extent that financial-market participants use academic research for trading 
purposes, they could lead to resource misallocation.  
Data vendors have little obvious incentive to deliberately change the historical record. However, 
maintaining large databases of historical records is both costly and technologically demanding, not 
least in the wake of mergers among data vendors. Given that demand for long time-series of 
accurate historical financial data (as opposed to real-time information) has traditionally come 
mainly from academics, who typically pay discounted usage fees,2 one should not take the integrity 
of historical data for granted.  
In this paper, we demonstrate that the integrity of historical financial data is an important issue 
for empiricists to consider. On May 22, 2007, and in reaction to an earlier version of this paper, 
Thomson Financial (“Thomson”) began issuing confidential guidance to select clients regarding the 
integrity of its I/B/E/S historical detail recommendations database.3 This database contains 
investment ratings for U.S. listed companies issued by sell-side analysts at most of the brokerage 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Rosenberg and Houglet (1974), Bennin (1980), Shumway (1997), Canina et al. (1998), Shumway 
and Warther (1999), and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001). See http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/rc/crsp-cstat-
references.htm for a summary of academic work on problems with financial databases.  
2 The recent rise in popularity of quantitative investment strategies may have increased demand for historical data. 
3 The guidance is available only to clients, only on request, and only upon signing of a non-disclosure agreement. 
Thomson have shared their findings with us, and we are not bound by any non-disclosure agreement, though we are 
unable to quote verbatim from Thomson’s report. Interested readers who are Thomson clients are advised to obtain the 
report directly from Thomson. 
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firms active in the U.S.  The substance of the guidance, summarized in the Appendix, is that tens of 
thousands of historical recommendations have inadvertently been added, dropped, or altered, and 
that the data handling errors that apparently led to these changes have occurred throughout the 
existence of the database (beginning before 2000 and continuing through the summer of 2007). As a 
result, the actual contents of the recommendations database depend on the precise date when a 
client downloaded the data. In other words, two clients interested in the same historical time period 
who obtained the data on different dates would likely have analyzed two quite different sets of data.  
We explore the implications of these problems for academic research. The academic literature 
on analyst stock recommendations, much of which uses I/B/E/S data, is voluminous.4 Michaely and 
Womack (2005), in their review of the literature, note that several key topics are each the subject of 
numerous academic papers. These topics include the compensation, incentives, and biases of 
analysts; the characteristics of recommended stocks; the investment value of recommendations; and 
biases and conflicts of interest in the production of recommendations. Given this keen academic 
interest, as well as the intense scrutiny that research analysts face in the marketplace and from 
regulators, and the growing popularity of trading strategies based on analyst output, changes to the 
historical I/B/E/S database are of obvious interest to academics and practitioners alike.  
We document that the historical contents of the I/B/E/S recommendations database have been 
quite unstable over time. Across a sequence of seven nearly annual downloads of the entire I/B/E/S 
historical recommendations database, obtained between 2000 and 2007, we find that between 1.6% 
and 21.7% of matched observations are different from one download to the next. For instance, of 
the 332,145 observations on the 2003 tape, 57,784 (17.4%) are changed in some manner on the 
2004 tape. We identify four types of changes which we term alterations, deletions, additions, and 
                                                          
4 As of Mar. 31, 2008, Google Scholar identifies 960 articles and working papers using the keywords “I/B/E/S”, 
“analysts”, and “recommendations.”  
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anonymizations. For instance, comparing the 2003 tape to the 2004 tape over the period 1993-2003, 
we find 2,412 instances of alterations to a recommendation level (say, turning a “buy” into a 
“hold”), 3,969 deletions (i.e., records on the 2003 tape that have been deleted from the 2004 tape), 
33,339 additions (i.e., records dated 1993-2003 that appear on the 2004 tape but not on the 2003 
tape), and 18,064 instances where the analyst’s name subsequently went missing from a 
recommendation. Across all tapes, we find 15,825 alterations, 131,417 deletions, 74,218 additions, 
and 23,838 anonymizations. 
Thomson regard the 2007 tape as purged of the data errors we have identified, except that it 
continues to include alterations made as a result of broker requests for retrospective changes to their 
recommendation scales. Remarkably, when we undo these retrospective changes to create a true 
“as-was” 2007 tape, we find that between 10% and 30% of all observations on the earlier tapes are 
now recorded differently on the 2007 tape. For instance, of the 332,145 records on the 2003 tape, 
10,848 appear on the 2007 tape with a corrected recommendation level, 13,896 have been 
permanently erased from the I/B/E/S historical database, 5,492 records missing from the 2004 tape 
have been added, and analysts’ names have been reinstated in 6,241 records. 
We demonstrate that these changes have a large and significant effect on several features of the 
data that are routinely used by academics and practitioners. 
• Effect on the distribution of recommendations: Relative to the 2007 tape, recommendations 
affected by the changes on the 2000-2002 tapes are too optimistic, while those on the 2003-2005 
tapes are too pessimistic. 
• Patterns in affected recommendations: The changes cluster according to three widely used 
conditioning variables: The analyst’s reputation, the brokerage firm’s size and status, and the 
boldness of the recommendation. “All-star” analysts and brokerage firms sanctioned under the 
Global Settlement are overrepresented among affected recommendations on the 2000 and 2001 
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tapes and underrepresented on later tapes. “Bold” recommendations (those far from consensus) 
are overrepresented among affected recommendations on all tapes. 
• Effect on trading signals: Trading signals such as “upgrades” and “downgrades” are the key 
inputs for a large literature on the economic impact and profitability of analyst research (see 
Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2005) for a survey). We find that between 16.1% and 34.6% of 
historic trading signals are reclassified on the 2007 tape. While “reinitiations” are particularly 
prone to correction, corrections frequently turn downgrades into upgrades or vice versa. 
We illustrate the potential effects these changes to the I/B/E/S recommendations database can 
have on research by examining three central tests from the empirical analyst literature: The 
profitability of trading signals; the profitability of changes in consensus recommendations; and the 
persistence in individual analyst performance. We find that the changes to the I/B/E/S historical 
record have an economically and statistically significant impact on both calendar-time portfolio 
returns and three-day event returns to trading signals computed from the different data downloads. 
For example, three-day event returns to upgrades average 3.02% on the 2007 tape but only 2.30% 
on the 2004 tape (a difference of 71 basis points over three days, and a 31% increase in percentage 
terms), while three-day event returns to downgrades average -4.72% on the 2007 tape but only -
3.79% on the 2004 tape (a difference of 93 basis points, and a 24% decrease). The performance of 
portfolio strategies based on changes in consensus recommendations (as in Jegadeesh et al. (2004)) 
shows similar variation across tapes. For instance, we document a temporary boost to the pre-2001 
back-testing performance of such strategies on the 2003-2005 tapes relative to the 2002 tape, a 
boost which then vanishes on the 2007 tape.  
The track records of individual analysts are also affected. Analysts’ track records are the key 
variable of interest in several strands of the literature, notably the debate over conflicts of interest in 
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the analyst industry,5 as well as studies of individual analysts’ stock-picking skill. We perform a 
standard test of persistence in analysts’ stock-picking ability on each of our tapes. This reveals that 
the 2001 through 2005 I/B/E/S downloads yield inflated estimates of persistence compared to the 
adjusted 2007 tape.  
Taken together, our findings suggest that the pervasive data changes we document in this paper 
do not simply increase noise; because they have systematic and persistent components, they can and 
do affect the size of estimated effects. Although we take comfort in the fact that the three tests we 
examine are generally not overturned directionally across the tapes we examine, the magnitude and 
significance of the across-tape variation is still disconcerting. Since we did not search over all 
possible tests using analyst recommendation data, we cannot say to what extent different stylized 
facts in the literature may or may not be affected by these changes to the historical record. What we 
can say with certainty is that as a result of our investigation, the quality of post-2006 data 
downloads will exceed that of any older downloads. Thus, an important lesson for empirical 
researchers is not to recycle older downloads, even if a fresh download requires substantial 
investment in routine data cleaning.6 With regard to “undoing” the broker-requested retrospective 
changes to recommendation scales, we can also report that Thomson is now planning to produce a 
true “as-was” historical recommendations database in response to our investigation. This should 
allow future researchers to consistently and accurately replicate any analysis that employs historical 
analyst recommendations data. 
                                                          
5 See, for example, Michaely and Womack (1999), Lin and McNichols (1998), and Hong and Kubik (2003), among 
others. As of Mar. 31, 2008, Google Scholar lists 227 articles and working papers containing the key words “analysts”, 
“conflicts of interest”, and “I/B/E/S”.  
6 For example, I/B/E/S periodically changes its historical broker (bmaskcd) and analyst (amaskcd) codes, so programs 
that adjust for broker mergers or that track analysts across brokers typically need updating after every fresh download. 
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I. Overview of Changes to the I/B/E/S Historical Recommendations Database  
I.A The Scope of the Problem  
Our analysis is based on comparisons of seven snapshots of the entire I/B/E/S U.S. historical 
detail recommendations database, downloaded at roughly annual intervals between 2000 and 2007. 
Each snapshot covers the period from the inception of the database (Oct. 29, 1993) to about two 
months prior to the respective download date. The cutoff dates of our snapshots are 7/20/00 (“2000 
tape”), 1/24/02 (“2001 tape”), 7/18/02 (“2002 tape”), 3/20/03 (“2003 tape”), 3/18/04 (“2004 tape”), 
12/15/05 (“2005 tape”), and 9/20/07 (“2007 tape”). According to Thomson, the 2007 tape contains 
data purged of all data errors we have identified, except that it continues to include alterations made 
as a result of broker requests for retrospective changes to their recommendation scales. 
A typical I/B/E/S record includes the analyst’s name and her six-digit amaskcd identifier as 
assigned by I/B/E/S; the name of the analyst’s employer at the time of the recommendation; the 
I/B/E/S ticker and historical CUSIP of the company concerned; the date the recommendation was 
issued; the last date it was considered still in force; and the recommendation itself. Different 
brokerage firms use different wordings for their recommendations, which I/B/E/S translates into a 
numerical score on the following scale: Strong buy=1, buy=2, hold=3, sell=4, strong sell=5.  
Table I, Panel A examines year-to-year changes to the database by comparing data from 
adjacent annual downloads, which are merged by standardized brokerage firm code,7 I/B/E/S ticker, 
and recommendation date. We focus on the period for which each pair of downloads has 
overlapping coverage (that is, we ignore recommendations from the later tape dated after the cut-off 
date of the earlier tape.) Thus, we ask if two researchers, looking at the same time period but 
working with data obtained on slightly different dates, would face materially different data.  
                                                          
7 In some cases, I/B/E/S uses multiple codes to identify the same brokerage firm (e.g., NOMURA and NOMURAUS 
both decode to Nomura Securities). We standardize such name variations before merging the downloads. 
  
7
 
Panel A reveals a disturbingly high incidence of ex post changes to the I/B/E/S 
recommendations data. Across our sequence of tapes, 10.8%, 8.4%, 13.1%, 17.4%, 21.7%, and 
1.6% of observations are changed by our next download date. For instance, of the 450,225 
observations on the 2004 tape, 97,579 (21.7%) look different on the 2005 tape. This indicates that 
the historical contents of the I/B/E/S recommendations database have been quite unstable over time. 
Only since about Dec. 2005 has the database been relatively stable, with only 6,594 historic 
observations (1.6%) being changed by Sept. 2007. 
Panel A also provides a breakdown of the following four types of ex post changes: 
1) Alterations: A broker/ticker/date triad that appears on both tapes but for which the 
recommendation on one tape is different than on the next tape.  
2) Deletions: A broker/ticker/date triad that appears on the earlier tape but not on the later tape.  
3) Additions: A broker/ticker/date triad that appears on the later tape but not on the earlier tape. 
4) Anonymizations: Cases where the analyst associated with a broker/ticker/date triad is 
identified by name on the earlier tape but is anonymous on the later tape. 
The number of alterations varies from 131 (between the 2005 and 2007 tapes) to 8,963 (between 
the 2002 and 2003 tapes). Deletions run in the thousands for every pairwise comparison, peaking in 
2005 when 92,244 records – 20.5% of the 450,225 records on the 2004 tape – were deleted. 
Additions also run in the thousands, peaking at 33,339 between 2003 and 2004. Finally, 
anonymizations are concentrated between 2002 and 2004: Between 2002 and 2003, 5,003 records 
were anonymized, followed by a further 18,064 anonymizations between 2003 and 2004.  
The evidence in Panel A suggests that two researchers downloading I/B/E/S recommendations a 
few months apart could face materially different data. However, it does not speak to the question 
how inaccurate these data might be. Answering that question requires that we compare each 
download to the “truth”. To the extent that the 2007 tape corrects errors arising from accidental 
  
8
 
deletions and anonymizations, Thomson considers it the most historically accurate record of analyst 
recommendations. However, the 2007 tape still contains broker-requested retrospective changes to 
recommendation scales, so we reverse these alterations to get back to original, historical data.8 We 
refer to this as the “adjusted 2007 tape.” In Panel B, we compare each tape to the adjusted 2007 tape 
to illustrate the extent to which the six earlier tapes were contaminated by data problems.  
Panel B points to extensive data problems in each of the earlier tapes. Between 10.0% and 
30.0% of observations on the respective tapes have been corrected on the adjusted 2007 tape. For 
instance, of the 450,225 records on the 2004 tape, 12,685 appear on the adjusted 2007 tape with a 
different recommendation level (either because Thomson corrected data errors or more often 
because we undid retrospective rating scale changes), 96,077 are no longer included in the I/B/E/S 
historical database as of 2007, and 4,381 records that should have been on the 2004 tape (but were 
not) have been added on the 2007 tape. In addition, 21,881 records that were anonymous on the 
2004 tape identify the analyst by name on the 2007 tape.9  
It is worth noting that the I/B/E/S recommendations database appears to have had the most data 
problems precisely around the time (namely in 2001 and 2004) when academic interest in analyst 
recommendations increased in the wake of first Regulation FD and then the Global Settlement.  
I.B Net Effect of Changes on the Distribution of Recommendations 
Table I illustrates that the I/B/E/S recommendations history has changed extensively throughout 
its existence. We now investigate whether these changes merely add noise to standard empirical 
tests or whether they are liable to create biases. Under the null that the changes affecting the I/B/E/S 
recommendations history are pure noise, we expect that the recommendation levels of affected 
                                                          
8 This adjusted version of the 2007 tape corresponds to the “as-was” historical recommendations database which 
Thomson intends to make available to researchers in response to our investigation. 
9 The 2007 tape reverses not only all the 23,832 anonymizations shown in Panel A, but also adds analyst names for 
32,665 broker/ticker/date triads that originally appeared without names on the earlier tapes. While welcome, such “de-
anonymizations” may affect the replicability of tests that rely on tracking analysts (e.g., models of career concerns). 
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records do not differ systematically from those that are unaffected.  
Table II suggests that the changes to the I/B/E/S recommendations database have non-random 
components, both year-to-year (Panel A) and relative to the adjusted 2007 tape (Panel B). In four of 
the pairwise comparisons shown in Panel A (2000-01, 2002-03, 2003-04, and 2005-07), the net 
effect of the changes is to make the recommendations history look less optimistic. For instance, the 
average recommendation on the 2002 tape is 2.11 (a little below a “buy” recommendation). The 
36,755 records subject to an ex post change have an average recommendation of 1.98 on the 2002 
tape. On the 2003 tape, their average is significantly more pessimistic (mean: 2.28), largely because 
the 2003 deletions are unusually optimistic (mean: 1.63) while the 2003 additions are unusually 
pessimistic (mean: 2.45). In the two remaining pairwise comparisons (2001-2002 and 2004-2005), 
the net effect of the changes is to make the recommendations history look more optimistic.  
Relative to the adjusted 2007 tape, which we regard as more historically accurate, changed 
recommendations on the first three tapes are too optimistic (i.e., the effect of the corrections on the 
2007 tape is to lower the average of these recommendations) while those on the last three tapes are 
too pessimistic. As we will show in Section II, these apparently systematic patterns in changed 
recommendations have a direct impact on standard empirical tests. 
I.C Patterns in Affected Recommendations  
In addition to being either systematically optimistic or pessimistic, recommendations affected 
by the changes to the I/B/E/S recommendations history appear to cluster according to three popular 
conditioning variables: The analyst’s reputation, the brokerage firm’s size and status, and the 
boldness of the recommendation. We measure analyst reputation using all-star status, as designated 
in the Oct. issue of Institutional Investor magazine preceding the recommendation in question. We 
divide brokerage firms into the 12 (generally large) firms sanctioned under the Global Settlement 
and all other firms. And we code a recommendation as bold if it was one notch or more above or 
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below consensus (=mean recommendation) computed over the prior three months (requiring at least 
three outstanding recommendations).  
Table III compares the frequency of these conditioning variables in the universe of historical 
recommendations and in the set of changed recommendations. We compare each tape to the next 
tape as well as to the adjusted 2007 tape.  
All-stars account for 15.3% of recommendations on the 2000 tape (column (1)) and for 19.6% 
of the recommendations subject to changes between 2000 and 2001 (column (2)). These fractions 
are significantly different from each other, implying that all-stars are overrepresented among these 
changed recommendations. The same is true for the 2001 tape. On the 2002 through 2004 tapes, 
changed recommendations disproportionately come from unrated analysts. Relative to the adjusted 
2007 tape, recommendations by unrated analysts are significantly more likely to need correction on 
every tape except the 2001 tape (column (3)). Thus, tests comparing all-stars to unrated analysts 
may yield different results depending on which tape is used. 
Sanctioned banks are significantly overrepresented among affected recommendations on the 
2000 and 2001 tapes, and underrepresented for all later tapes (column (5)). Relative to the adjusted 
2007 tape, sanctioned banks are associated with a significantly lower need for corrections on every 
tape except the 2001 tape (column (6)). 
Finally, bold recommendations are significantly overrepresented among affected records on all 
tapes (column (8)). They are also consistently and significantly more likely to be subject to 
corrections on the adjusted 2007 tape (column (9)). 
II. Impact on Typical Analyses of Stock Recommendations  
In this section, we document the potential effects of the I/B/E/S changes for academic research, 
while bearing in mind that they may also affect the work of regulators, legislators, litigators, and 
investment professionals, who may also rely on archival databases such as I/B/E/S. We focus on 
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three central findings of the analyst literature: The profitability of trading signals; the profitability of 
changes in consensus recommendations; and the persistence in individual analyst performance. We 
stress that we did not search over every possible result that might be impacted by the data changes, 
nor did we necessarily pick the results or the specifications that were most likely to be affected. Our 
goal was simply to assess if, and by how much, the changes to the historical record that we 
document might affect key stylized facts in the empirical analyst literature. 
II.A Effects on Trading Signal Classifications 
Besides changing the distribution of recommendation levels, the alterations, deletions, and 
additions also affect recommendation changes or “trading signals”, the key inputs for a large 
literature on the profitability of analyst recommendations (see Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2005) for 
a review). For each broker/ticker pair, we code trading signals as follows. The first time a broker 
recommends a stock is an initiation. Subsequent recommendations represent either upgrades, 
downgrades, or reiterations, as long as no more than 12 months have elapsed since the previous 
recommendation.10 Otherwise, they are coded as re-initiations. We also use the I/B/E/S stop file to 
check for suspensions of broker coverage and code resumptions of coverage as re-initiations.  
Table IV provides a breakdown, for each tape, of the distributions of all trading signals and of 
those that are affected by the changes to the I/B/E/S database. For instance, of the 222,694 trading 
signals on the 2000 tape shown in Panel A, 37,352 (50,417 changes less 13,065 additions) are 
subject to corrections according to the adjusted 2007 tape. Compared to Table I, this means that a 
larger number of trading signals than of recommendations levels are affected by the changes to the 
I/B/E/S data. This occurs because changing one recommendation usually changes the trading signal 
of the next recommendation as well. When we add the 13,065 additions, we have 50,417 trading 
signals that are different on the 2007 tape than on the 2000 tape, for the exact same time period. 
                                                          
10 We use the I/B/E/S field “revdats” to check whether the previous recommendation continues to be in effect.  
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The breakdown by type of trading signal shows that 8.9% of the downgrades on the 2000 tape 
are coded differently on the adjusted 2007 tape, 9.4% of upgrades, 23.1% of reiterations, 7% of 
initiations, and 73% of re-iterations. The high incidence of corrections among re-iterations is due to 
additions, which have the effect of filling “gaps” in the time series of recommendations at the 
broker/ticker level so that fewer recommendations are now 12 or more months apart.  
The right-hand side of Table IV provides a transition matrix for the changed trading signals 
from the earlier tape to the 2007 tape. For instance, 526 recommendations classified as reiterations 
on the 2000 tape have become downgrades on the 2007 tape, 143 downgrades have become 
upgrades, and 272 upgrades have become reiterations. Re-initiations are a rich source of “new” 
trading signals, generating an additional 3,624 downgrades and 2,596 upgrades on the 2007 tape.  
Panels B through F repeat these analyses for the 2001 through 2005 tapes. In each case, a large 
fraction of trading signals change, ranging from 16.1% on the 2005 tape to 34.6% on the 2004 tape. 
We again find sizeable increases in the number of trading signals after I/B/E/S’s corrections as per 
the adjusted 2007 tape, mainly as a result of migration out of the “re-initiation” category.  
II.B Effects on Returns to Trading on Upgrades and Downgrades 
What is the likely effect of these changes to historic trading signals on backtests of the 
profitability of strategies that condition on upgrades and downgrades? For brevity, we focus on the 
2004 and adjusted 2007 tapes. This is sufficient to illustrate our main point. In unreported tests, we 
find similarly large and significant differences across a variety of additional pairwise tape 
comparisons.  
For each tape, we form two portfolios: (1) An upgrade portfolio, consisting of all stocks that at 
least one analyst upgraded on a given date (e.g., from a buy to a strong buy); and (2) a downgrade 
portfolio, comprised of all stocks that at least one analyst downgraded on a given date (e.g., from a 
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buy to a hold).11 Portfolio construction closely follows Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) and 
Barber et al. (2006). In the upgrade portfolio, for example, a recommended stock enters the 
portfolio at the close of trading on the day the recommendation is announced. This explicitly 
excludes the announcement-day return, on the assumption that many investors likely learn of 
recommendation changes only with a delay. Each recommended stock remains in the portfolio for 
the lesser of two weeks or until the stock is downgraded or dropped from coverage by the analyst.12 
If more than one analyst changes a recommendation on a particular stock on a given date, the stock 
will appear multiple times in the portfolio on that date (once for each recommendation change).  
We then compute daily calendar-time buy-and-hold portfolio returns for each tape for the period 
over which the tapes overlap (that is, Oct. 29, 1993 to Mar. 18, 2004). Assuming an equal dollar 
investment in each stock, the portfolio return on date t is given by ∑∑ == tt ni itni itit xxR 11 / , where Rit is 
the date t return on stock i, nt is the number of stocks in the portfolio, and xit is the compounded 
daily return of stock i from the close of trading on the day of the recommendation change through 
day t-1. (For a stock recommended on day t-1, xit = 1.)  
Panel A of Table V reports the results for the upgrade portfolio (columns (1)-(3)) and for the 
downgrade portfolio (columns (4)-(6)). Ret07 and Ret04 are the average daily calendar-time 
portfolio returns (in percent) on the 2007 and 2004 tapes, respectively, and Diffret is the average 
daily return difference between the 2007 and 2004 tapes. We also compute abnormal portfolio 
returns (DiffXret) by estimating “four-factor” alphas (Carhart (1997)), which equal the intercept 
from a regression of Diffret less the risk-free rate on the daily excess return of the market over the 
risk-free rate (MKT) and the return difference between small and large-capitalization stocks (SMB), 
                                                          
11 We have experimented with other portfolio classifications (such as including initiations at buy or strong buy in the 
upgrade portfolio and including initiations at hold, sell, or strong sell in the downgrade portfolio) with similar results. 
12 The choice of a two-week cutoff point is arbitrary but not selective. We have experimented with a variety of holding 
periods, from three trading days up to one calendar year, and the differences across tapes vary significantly across 
holding periods, further highlighting our main insight. These results, excluded for brevity, are available on request.  
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high and low book-to-market stocks (HML), and high and low price-momentum stocks (UMD). 
Column (1) indicates that over the full period of overlap (Oct. 29, 1993 to Mar. 18, 2004), 
upgrades on the adjusted 2007 tape earn 16.1 basis points per day on average, while upgrades on the 
2004 tape earn only 14.8 basis points per day. The average daily abnormal return difference 
(DiffXret) between the 2004 and 2007 upgrade samples is 1.3 basis points per day (3.3% 
annualized). When we split the sample period on Mar. 10, 2000, the day of the Nasdaq peak, we 
find a substantially larger abnormal return difference of 3.6 basis points per day (9.1% annualized) 
in the post-“bubble” period (column (2)), and no significant difference in performance prior to Mar. 
10, 2000 (column (3)). Thus, the changes to the I/B/E/S 2004 historical record appear to have a 
disproportionate effect on research that focuses on more recent periods. 
Results for downgrades are similar. Downgrades earn -9.5 basis points per day on the adjusted 
2007 tape, but only -7.8 basis points on the 2004 tape. The average difference, DiffXret, is 1.6 basis 
points per day (4% annualized) for the whole period and 4 basis points per day (10.1% annualized) 
for the post-bubble period. As with the upgrade tests, each of these results is highly statistically 
significant. Prior to Mar. 10, 2000, there is again no significant difference in performance. 
Overall, these calendar-time portfolio results indicate that back-tests done using the 2004 data 
instead of the historically more accurate 2007 data would significantly understate the profitability of 
trading on both upgrades and downgrades, especially in the period following the bubble.  
We next compare the market reaction to upgrades and downgrades across tapes. To do so, we 
compute three-day raw event return (equal to the geometrically cumulated return for the day before, 
day of, and day after the recommendation change) and three-day excess returns (equal to the raw 
stock return less the appropriate size-decile return of the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index). 
Panel B of Table V reports the results for the full sample of upgrades (in the column entitled “All 
upgrades”) as well as for individual upgrade categories (e.g., “2to1” refers to an upgrade from a buy 
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to a strong buy, while “5to4” refers to an upgrade from a strong sell to a sell). We use the entire 
period over which the 2004 and adjusted 2007 tapes overlap (i.e., Oct. 29, 1993 to Mar. 18, 2004). 
For all upgrades, raw three-day event returns average 3.02% on the 2007 tape but only 2.30% on the 
2004 tape. DiffEret, the average difference in raw event returns between the two tapes, is 71.2 basis 
points over the three days (a 31% increase in percentage terms from the 2004 tape to the 2007 tape), 
while DiffEXret, the average difference in excess event returns between the two tapes, is 72.4 basis 
points per day. In addition, we find large and statistically significant differences between the tapes 
for several of the individual upgrade categories (e.g., “2to1”, “3to2”, “4to2”, and “4to3”).  
Panel C shows that the differences across the downgrade samples are equally striking. Three-
day event returns on the 2004 tape are -3.79%, versus -4.72% on the adjusted 2007 tape. DiffEret, 
the difference in three-day returns between the two tapes, equals -92.6 basis points, a 24% decrease 
in percentage terms from the 2004 tape to the 2007 tape; DiffEXret too is large at -89 basis points 
and statistically different from zero. Several of the individual downgrade categories show large 
differences between the two tapes (e.g., “2to4”, “3to4”, and “3to5” are each associated with 
differences in excess of 200 basis points over three days).  
In sum, the changes to the I/B/E/S historical record have an economically and statistically 
significant impact on both calendar-time portfolio returns and three-day event returns to trading 
signals. These results illustrate how the changes can affect standard analyses of recommendations.  
II.C Effects on Returns to Consensus Recommendations  
Another commonly used feature of analyst data is the consensus analyst recommendation for a 
particular firm. Consensus recommendations are frequently employed in quantitative trading 
strategies, following evidence that sorting based on consensus recommendations (Barber et al. 
(2001, 2003)), and particularly on changes in consensus recommendations (Jegadeesh et al. (2004)), 
is a profitable strategy. How do the changes to the I/B/E/S database affect such a strategy?  
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We employ a standard portfolio classification technique that each day sorts firms into quintiles 
based on the lagged change in consensus recommendations on the previous day.13 For this purpose, 
recommendations are reverse-scored from 5 (strong buy) to 1 (strong sell). The consensus 
recommendation for a ticker equals the mean outstanding recommendation at the end of a day 
(based on a minimum of three recommendations).  
Table VI reports daily portfolio returns for a trading strategy (“spread”) that buys stocks in the 
highest change quintile (Q5) and shorts stocks in the lowest change quintile (Q1). We calculate 
abnormal portfolio returns by computing daily characteristic-adjusted returns constructed as in 
Daniel et al. (1997) [henceforth DGTW].14 DGTW returns are raw returns minus the returns on a 
value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, industry-adjusted market-book, and 
one-year momentum quintiles. The strategy is performed separately (and identically) on the 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, and adjusted 2007 tapes, and differences across tapes are reported. For ease of 
comparison with the earlier literature on consensus recommendations, much of which focuses on 
the period through Dec. 2000, we split the sample in half. Results for the pre-2001 period are in 
columns (1)-(3) and those for the post-2001 period are in columns (5) to (8).15  
While the strategy is profitable in the pre-2001 period, according to each data download, it 
performs significantly better on the 2003, 2004, and 2005 tapes than on the 2002 or 2007 tapes, 
even though we back-test the strategy over the exact same time period. The magnitude of these 
differences is nontrivial, ranging from 1.9 to 2.1 basis points per day (4.8% to 5.3% annualized; see 
column (4)). This means that the 2003-2005 tapes overstate the profitability of this strategy by 7.1% 
to 7.8% relative to the performance found on the 2007 tape.  
                                                          
13 Using a monthly rebalancing rule yields similar results (available on request).  
14 We obtain similar results when we estimate abnormal returns relative to a four-factor model constructed as in Section 
II.B (available on request). 
15 We drop the 2000 tape from this analysis as it ends before the end of 2000 and so covers a shorter time period than 
the other tapes. Similarly, we drop the 2001 tape for lack of sufficient data in the post-2001 time period. 
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In columns (5) to (8), each tape is compared individually to the adjusted 2007 tape from Jan. 1, 
2001 to the cut-off date of the tape in question, Thus, the spread estimates for the 2007 tape shown 
in column (7) differ across tapes depending on the exact sample period covered by the tape in 
question. The results suggest that trading on consensus changes continues to produce large and 
significant abnormal returns in the post-2001 time period across the various tapes. And while the 
spread estimates for the 2003-2005 tapes are not significantly different from the 2007 comparison 
tape, the 2002 spread estimate now is: Trading on consensus changes yielded 6.2 basis points more 
per day according to the 2002 tape than according to the adjusted 2007 tape (15.6% annualized). 
This translates into a percentage improvement of 17.3% relative to the performance found on the 
2007 tape.  
Table VI thus reveals a temporary boost to the pre-2001 back-testing performance of the 
consensus change trading strategy on the 2003-2005 tapes relative to the 2002 tape, a boost that 
then vanishes on our corrected version of the 2007 tape. By contrast, after 2001, it is the 2002 tape 
that yields significantly different estimates from the 2007 tape. These non-trivial fluctuations in 
back-testing results across different I/B/E/S downloads (but covering identical time periods) again 
illustrate the practical impact of the changes we document in this paper.  
II.D Effects on Persistence in Analysts’ Stock-Picking Ability 
Each of the four types of changes to the I/B/E/S database can alter an individual analyst’s track 
record. Several strands of the labor economics, finance, and accounting literatures rely on analyst 
track records in their empirical tests, and hence are potentially affected by the data changes we 
document: Studies of analyst career concerns (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000)), conflicts of 
interest in the brokerage industry (e.g., Michaely and Womack (1999), Lin and McNichols (1998), 
Hong and Kubik (2003)), and persistence in individual analysts’ stock-picking ability (e.g., Mikhail, 
Walther, and Willis (2004), Li (2005)).  
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In this section, we investigate the impact of the data changes on estimates of stock-picking 
persistence. We perform a standard test (similar to Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2004)) on each 
tape. Analysts are grouped into quintiles at the beginning of each half-year period based on the 
average five-day excess return of their recommendations over the prior half-year period.16 The 
excess return is the geometrically cumulated DGTW characteristic-adjusted return for the two days 
before through the two days after the recommendation; DGTW returns are constructed as in the 
previous section. The “persistence spread” equals the difference between the average five-day 
DGTW-adjusted return of the highest quintile minus the average five-day DGTW-adjusted return of 
the lowest quintile. The persistence spread measures the extent to which good past performers 
continue to perform well in the future.  
Column (1) of Table VII reports average persistence spreads, where each average is computed 
over the full available sample period for each tape. Each tape is compared individually to the 
adjusted 2007 tape; therefore, the estimates for the 2007 tape shown in column (2) differ across the 
2000-2005 tapes depending on the exact sample period covered by the tape in question. Pairwise 
differences in persistence spreads compared to the adjusted 2007 tape are reported in column (3).  
Consistent with the findings in Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2004), column (1) indicates 
persistence in individual analysts’ stock-picking performance in each download, with average five-
day persistence spreads of at least 240 basis points across the 2000-2005 tapes. However, the 
magnitude of this spread varies markedly across tapes, and the 2007 tape shows smaller persistence 
spreads than each of the other tapes (except for the 2000 tape). Column (3) shows that three of the 
six pairwise comparisons to the 2007 tape yield significant differences in persistence spreads. For 
example, the difference between the 2001 and 2007 tape is 38.6 basis points, an increase of 15.0% 
                                                          
16 In unreported tests we find that using quarterly or annual (rather than semi-annual) windows to measure the past 
performance of individual analysts yields similar results (available on request).  
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relative to the amount of persistence found on the 2007 tape. Similarly significant differences exist 
between the 2002 and 2007 tapes (52.3 basis points, a 20.5% increase relative to 2007) and between 
the 2004 and 2007 tapes (18.4 basis points, a 7.5% increase relative to 2007). Overall, these tests 
reveal that past I/B/E/S downloads generally yield larger (often significantly larger) estimates of 
persistence in stock-picking ability than does the 2007 tape.  
This result is even more pronounced when we filter on analysts’ all-star status (defined as in 
Section I.C). A common modification to the persistence trading strategy, in practice, is to buy on 
recommendations by all-star analysts who are also in quintile 5 and to sell on recommendations by 
non-all star analysts ranked in quintile 1. This assumes asymmetry in persistence among all-stars: 
They are likely to repeat good past performance but not poor past performance. Imposing this 
screen increases the differences in persistence spreads across the tapes. For example, Panel B of 
Table VII shows a difference between the 2001 and 2007 tapes of 82.0 basis points over five trading 
days, an increase of 25.3% relative to the amount of persistence found on the 2007 tape. Similarly 
large differences exist between the 2002 and 2007 tapes (66.3 basis points, a 21.1% increase 
relative to 2007) and between the 2003 and 2007 tapes (36.6 basis points, a 12.1% increase relative 
to 2007).  
Taken together, our findings suggest that while we continue to find evidence of persistence in 
analyst performance using the historically more accurate 2007 data, the magnitude of such 
persistence is substantially lower than if one were to use prior contaminated versions of I/B/E/S.  
III. Conclusions 
We document widespread ex post changes to the historical contents of the I/B/E/S analyst stock 
recommendations database. Across a sequence of seven nearly annual downloads of the entire 
recommendations database, obtained between 2000 and 2007, we find that between 1.6% and 
21.7% of matched observations are different from one download to the next. When we use a 
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cleaned-up version of the 2007 tape as a point of comparison, we find that between 10% and 30% of 
all observations on the earlier tapes are now recorded differently on the 2007 tape.  
These changes appear non-random and have a large and significant impact on several features of 
the data that are routinely used by academics and practitioners. They cluster according to three 
popular conditioning variables: Analyst reputation, broker status, and boldness. The changes also 
have systematically optimistic and pessimistic patterns that vary across time and that affect the 
classification of trading signals. We demonstrate the potential effects these changes have on 
academic research by examining three central tests from the empirical analyst literature: The 
profitability of trading signals; the profitability of changes in consensus recommendations; and the 
persistence in individual analyst performance. In each case, despite examining identical sample 
periods, we find economically and statistically significant differences in estimated effects across our 
various downloads. 
Our results demonstrate that the integrity of historical data is an important issue for empiricists 
to consider. While most empiricists are accustomed to dealing with data issues like selection bias or 
measurement error, they seldom question the very constancy of historical data. Given the 
conflicting incentives of data providers, and the technological demands of handling vast (and 
increasing) amounts of historical data, however, this tendency may be problematic. While our 
investigation has led to a clean-up of this particular database by Thomson, the extent to which data 
integrity problems plague other frequently used financial databases is an open question. 
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Appendix: What Happened? 
 
Deletions and Additions 
 
Most additions and deletions are symptoms of a systematic process error. This error has affected the 
database throughout its entire existence, until Thomson fixed the process, in response to our enquiries, in 
the spring of 2007.  
 
The error concerns the broker recommendation translation table which maps each broker’s 
recommendation scale onto the familiar five-point I/B/E/S scale. Recommendations enter the database 
by broker, ticker, and recommendation only (for example, “ABC, MSFT, market perform”). This 
information is then matched up by broker to a broker translation table, in which ABC’s recommendation 
of “market perform” is translated as I/B/E/S recommendation level 3. Thomson contends that its data 
entry clerks occasionally overwrote existing entries in the translation table when faced with variations or 
changes in wording of the broker’s recommendation. For example, if ABC changes its “market perform” 
recommendations to “mkt. performer”, a clerk may overwrite broker ABC’s “market perform” entry 
when adding the “mkt. performer” entry to the table. As a result, the next time the historical 
recommendations database is created for export to clients, the translation table will fail to translate any 
of ABC’s historic “market perform” recommendations. From a client’s point of view, these records will 
appear to have been deleted. Additions occur when another data entry clerk, by chance or because he has 
noticed the missing recommendations, at some later point adds the “market perform” entry back into the 
broker translation table.  
 
Thus, an entire level of a broker’s historic recommendations (e.g., every “sell”) can go missing for some 
time and then reappear. In this sense, additions are reversals of past deletions. To illustrate, in Sept. 
2001, I/B/E/S lost all 1,716 historic “market perform” recommendations of a particular broker. They 
were restored in a Nov. 2002 cleanup when Thomson noticed that thousands of recommendations were 
missing. Subscribers were apparently not notified. However, the Nov. 2002 cleanup did not address the 
cause of the deletions, which only came to light in the spring of 2007, as a result of our investigation. 
Thus, the database continued to experience deletions and additions until recently.  
 
Besides problems with the broker translation table, most remaining additions and deletions between 
2003 and 2005 were caused by the erroneous inclusion of recommendations issued by eight quantitative 
research groups.17 According to Thomson, these recommendations were not supposed to be viewable by 
its clients yet became part of the database some time between 2003 and 2004. They were subsequently 
permanently removed at some point between 2004 and 2005.18  
 
 
Anonymizations 
 
Thomson’s database stores recommendations by broker and not by analyst. To add the analyst’s identity, 
Thomson combines data from the recommendations database with data from the coverage table that 
records which analyst covers which tickers at which broker between which dates.  
 
                                                          
17 Note that the quantitative research groups produce algorithmic recommendations constrained to be symmetrically 
distributed. Thus, tests that include these data points will face lower average recommendation levels. 
18 In addition, some records were permanently deleted between 2000 and 2007 at the request of brokerage firms that no 
longer wished their data to be available through I/B/E/S. In such instances, Thomson issues a notification to its clients. 
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During 2003, Thomson undertook a major review of the coverage table in an effort to reconcile the 
I/B/E/S and First Call databases and to remove invalid coverage assignments. In the process, the start 
and end dates of various analyst/broker/ticker triads were changed. This sometimes resulted in some 
historic recommendations no longer being associated with an analyst and hence being “anonymized.” 
Separately, Thomson attempted to consolidate instances of multiple analyst codes for a given analyst but 
in the process removed the entire coverage history for some analysts.  
 
In response to an earlier version of this paper, in December 2006, Thomson changed the file generation 
process such that anonymizations should not occur in the future. 
 
 
Alterations 
 
Brokerage firms often tweak their rating scales. To illustrate, in the wake of the Global Settlement, 
many firms moved from a five- or four-point scale to a simpler three-point scale (say, buy/hold/sell). 
When brokers adopt new rating scales, they sometimes request that Thomson restate, retroactively, their 
entire history of recommendations in an effort to make past and future recommendations appear on the 
same scale. According to Thomson, the vast majority of alterations result from such requests. The 
remainder are the result of errors made by Thomson in effecting these requests.19 From a research point 
of view, retrospective ratings changes are problematic, as the recommendation recorded in the database 
no longer matches the recommendation market participants had access to at the time.  
                                                          
19 Thomson estimates that approximately 20% of the alterations that occurred between 2002 and 2004 are due to errors it 
made in restating broker recommendations retroactively.  
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Table I. Overview of Changes to the I/B/E/S Recommendations History. 
The table documents the extent, types, and time profile of changes to the I/B/E/S historical recommendations database. In 
Panel A, we examine year-to-year changes to the database by comparing data from adjacent annual downloads. We focus on 
the period for which each pair of downloads has overlapping coverage (that is, we ignore recommendations from the later 
tape that are dated after the cut-off date of the earlier tape.) The cutoff dates of our tapes are 7/20/00 (“2000 tape”), 1/24/02 
(“2001 tape”), 7/18/02 (“2002 tape”), 3/20/03 (“2003 tape”), 3/18/04 (“2004 tape”), 12/15/05 (“2005 tape”), and 9/20/07 
(“2007 tape”). According to Thomson, the 2007 tape contains data purged of all data errors we have identified, except that it 
continues to include broker-requested, retrospective changes to recommendation scales. In Panel B, we compare the 2000 
through 2005 tapes to the 2007 tape, after reversing the broker-requested, retrospective changes to recommendation scales. 
This adjusted version of the 2007 tape corresponds to the “as-was” historical recommendations database which Thomson 
intends to make available to researchers in response to our investigation. The comparisons in Panel B therefore show the 
extent to which the earlier tapes were contaminated by data errors compared to the most accurate available historic record. 
We define an alteration as a broker/ticker/date triad that appears on both tapes but for which the recommendation on one tape 
is different than on the other tape. A deletion is a broker/ticker/date triad that appears on the earlier tape but not on the later 
tape to which it is compared. An addition is a broker/ticker/date triad that appears on the later comparison tape but not on the 
earlier tape. In Panel A, anonymizations refer to cases where the analyst associated with a broker/ticker/date triad is identified 
by name on the earlier tape but is anonymous on the later tape. In Panel B, de-anonymizations refer to cases where the analyst 
associated with a broker/ticker/date triad is identified by name on the 2007 tape but is anonymous on the earlier tape. We 
make this switch because as of Sept. 2007, Thomson has reversed not only the anonymizations shown in Panel A but has also 
added analyst names for 32,665 broker/ticker/date triads that originally appeared without names on the earlier tapes. 
 
Panel A: Breakdown of types of change in adjacent annual downloads 
Comparison 
No. of 
obs. on 
earlier 
All ex post 
changes Alterations Deletions Additions Anonymizations 
tapes tape No. % No. % No.  % No.  % No. % 
                
2000 vs. 2001 222,694 24,109 10.8% 2,237 1.0% 13,049 5.9% 8,647 3.9% 176 0.1% 
2001 vs. 2002 266,619 22,477 8.4% 493 0.2% 13,302 5.0% 8,661 3.2% 21 0.0% 
2002 vs. 2003 280,567 36,755 13.1% 8,963 3.2% 4,318 1.5% 18,471 6.6% 5,003 1.8% 
2003 vs. 2004 332,145 57,784 17.4% 2,412 0.7% 3,969 1.2% 33,339 10.0% 18,064 5.4% 
2004 vs. 2005 450,225 97,579 21.7% 1,589 0.4% 92,244 20.5% 3,208 0.7% 538 0.1% 
2005 vs. 2007 414,881 6,594 1.6% 131 0.0% 4,535 1.1% 1,892 0.5% 36 0.0% 
            
Panel B: Breakdown of types of change relative to adjusted 2007 tape 
Comparison 
No. of 
obs. on 
earlier 
All ex post 
changes Alterations Deletions Additions 
De-
anonymizations 
tapes tape No. % No. % No.  % No.  % No. % 
                
2000 vs. 2007 222,694 29,084 13.1% 1,528 0.7% 14,281 6.4% 13,065 5.9% 210 0.1% 
2001 vs. 2007 266,619 46,191 17.3% 2,172 0.8% 19,819 7.4% 23,713 8.9% 487 0.2% 
2002 vs. 2007 280,567 33,964 12.1% 2,267 0.8% 11,395 4.1% 19,755 7.0% 547 0.2% 
2003 vs. 2007 332,145 36,477 11.0% 10,848 3.3% 13,896 4.2% 5,492 1.7% 6,241 1.9% 
2004 vs. 2007 450,225 135,024 30.0% 12,685 2.8% 96,077 21.3% 4,381 1.0% 21,881 4.9% 
2005 vs. 2007 414,881 41,495 10.0% 12,513 3.0% 4,535 1.1% 1,889 0.5% 22,558 5.4% 
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Table II. Mean Recommendation Levels by Type of Change.  
The table reports mean recommendation levels among changed recommendations. In Panel A, changes are defined by 
reference to the next available tape. In Panel B, changes are defined by reference to the adjusted 2007 tape, after reversing the 
broker-requested, retrospective changes to recommendation scales on the 2007 tape; see Table I. Recommendations are 
scored by I/B/E/S on a five-point scale, where 1=strong buy and 5=sell. We test for differences in mean recommendations 
using standard two-sample F-tests. The tests compare mean recommendation levels among changed recommendations before 
and after the changes (column (1) vs. (2) and column (3) vs. (4)). In the last two columns, we compare average 
recommendation levels among deletions and additions (column (5) vs. (6)). Under the null that the changes affecting the 
I/B/E/S recommendations history are pure noise, we expect to find no significant changes in recommendation levels. 
Statistically significant differences in recommendation levels at the 5% level are indicated in bold typeface. 
 
 No. of    
Average rec.  
(all changes)  
Average rec. 
(alterations only)  Average rec. 
Comparison 
tapes 
obs on 
earlier 
tape 
Average 
rec. 
No. of 
ex post 
changes   
before 
(1) 
after 
(2)  
before 
(3) 
after 
(4)  
deletions 
(5) 
additions 
(6) 
             
Panel A             
2000 vs. 2001 222,694 2.11 24,109  2.28 2.41  2.03 2.68  2.33 2.35 
2001 vs. 2002 266,619 2.11 22,477  2.28 2.08  1.75 2.35  2.30 2.06 
2002 vs. 2003 280,567 2.11 36,755  1.98 2.28  2.07 2.01  1.63 2.45 
2003 vs. 2004 332,145 2.18 57,784  2.17 2.70  1.79 2.34  2.49 3.01 
2004 vs. 2005 450,225 2.36 97,579  2.89 1.78  1.42 2.10  2.92 1.54 
2005 vs. 2007 414,881 2.24 6,594  2.15 2.36  1.97 2.82  2.15 2.33 
             
Panel B             
2000 vs. 2007 222,694 2.11 29,084  2.16 2.30  1.88 2.14  2.20 2.33 
2001 vs. 2007 266,619 2.11 46,191  2.23 2.28  2.47 2.15  2.21 2.29 
2002 vs. 2007 280,567 2.11 33,964  2.24 2.38  2.64 1.98  2.18 2.44 
2003 vs. 2007 332,145 2.18 36,477  2.22 2.07  2.03 2.08  2.39 1.93 
2004 vs. 2007 450,225 2.36 135,024  2.68 2.06  2.03 1.99  2.89 1.74 
2005 vs. 2007 414,881 2.24 41,495  2.13 2.10  2.09 1.96  2.15 2.33 
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Table III. Patterns in Popular Conditioning Variables.  
We compare the frequency of three popular conditioning variables in the universe of historical recommendations and in the 
set of recommendations subject to ex post changes (due to alterations, deletions, additions, or anonymizations). We compare 
each tape to the next tape as well as to the adjusted 2007 tape, after reversing the broker-requested, retrospective changes to 
recommendation scales on the 2007 tape; see Table I. The three variables of interest condition on whether the analyst has all-
star status (the top three rated analysts in each sector, as designated in the Oct. issue of Institutional Investor magazine 
preceding the recommendation in question), whether the brokerage firm is among the 12 firms sanctioned under the Global 
Settlement, and whether the recommendation was “bold”, where bold is an indicator equaling one if the recommendation was 
one notch or more above or below consensus (=mean recommendation) computed over the prior three months (requiring at 
least three outstanding recommendations). We test for differences in fractions using standard two-sample F-tests of equal 
proportions. The tests compare the universe to the set of changed recommendations. Statistically significant differences at the 
5% level are indicated in bold typeface. 
 
 All-star analysts Global Settlement banks Bold recommendations 
 
Share of 
recom-  
Share of changed 
recommendations 
Share of 
recom- 
Share of changed 
recommendations 
Share of 
recom-  
Share of changed 
recommendations 
 
mendations 
universe 
(1)  
relative to 
next tape 
(2) 
relative to 
2007 tape
(3) 
mendations 
universe 
 (4) 
relative to 
next tape 
(5) 
relative to 
2007 tape
(6) 
mendations 
universe 
 (7)  
relative to 
next tape 
(8) 
relative to 
2007 tape
(9) 
        
2000 tape 15.3%  19.6% 9.1% 24.3% 37.6% 10.4% 30.6%  31.7% 35.9% 
2001 tape 13.3%  23.1% 16.3% 23.2% 44.2% 28.7% 31.0%  33.1% 35.7% 
2002 tape 15.0%  10.5% 8.6% 26.9% 16.0% 12.4% 30.4%  33.6% 37.4% 
2003 tape 15.0%  6.4% 9.2% 28.8% 11.6% 19.9% 31.6%  39.6% 36.3% 
2004 tape 11.5%  0.4% 1.4% 23.8% 1.7% 6.6% 32.5%  36.4% 35.6% 
2005 tape 13.9%  14.0% 4.0% 30.0% 12.8% 19.1% 32.3%  30.6% 33.7% 
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Table IV. Effect of Alterations, Deletions, and Additions on Trading Signals.  
We compare trading signals on the 2000 through 2005 tapes to the adjusted version of the 2007 tape, described in Table I. Tapes are matched up by standardized 
brokerage firm name, I/B/E/S ticker, and recommendation date. Observations on the 2007 tape dated after the cut-off date of the earlier tape are ignored. Trading signals 
are constructed on a per-broker and per-I/B/E/S-ticker basis using a 12-month look-back window. For instance, a downgrade is defined as a negative change from a 
recommendation issued by the same broker for the same I/B/E/S ticker within the previous 12 months. If the previous recommendation was issued more than 12 months 
ago, or was stopped according to the I/B/E/S stop file, the current recommendation is defined to be a reinitiation. If there is no previous recommendation, the current 
recommendation is defined to be an initiation. The table also provides a transition matrix for the changed trading signals from the earlier tape to the 2007 tape.  
 
 Orig. tape All changes  Trading signal according to adjusted 2007 tape   
Trading signal as of original tape No. No. %  downgrade upgrade reiteration initiation reinitiation deleted  
Panel A: Migrations in trading signals (2000 tape vs. 2007 tape) 
downgrade 50,814 4,507 8.9%   143 166 5 13 4,180  
upgrade 44,375 4,170 9.4%  125  272 14 14 3,745  
reiteration 11,102 2,564 23.1%  526 611  52 4 1,371  
initiation 89,177 6,249 7.0%  715 611 297 0 95 4,531  
reinitiation 27,226 19,862 73.0%  2,948 2,775 12,239 1,446  454  
added by 2007  13,065   3,624 2,596 2,119 4,483 243   
all signals 222,694 50,417 22.6%  7,938 6,736 15,093 6,000 369 14,281  
Panel B: Migrations in trading signals (2001 tape vs. 2007 tape) 
downgrade 65,282 6,979 10.7%   119 532 14 34 6,280  
upgrade 52,787 5,852 11.1%  69  489 6 27 5,261  
reiteration 13,203 3,432 26.0%  437 944  41 13 1,997  
initiation 100,852 7,675 7.6%  585 918 420 0 116 5,636  
reinitiation 34,495 26,208 76.0%  4,318 3,685 15,583 1,977  645  
added by 2007  23,713   7,499 4,158 3,500 7,613 943   
all signals 266,619 73,859 27.7%  12,908 9,824 20,524 9,651 1,133 19,819  
Panel C: Migrations in trading signals (2002 tape vs. 2007 tape) 
downgrade 67,798 4,101 6.0%   146 520 27 50 3,358  
upgrade 54,093 3,235 6.0%  71  520 19 38 2,587  
reiteration 14,605 3,092 21.2%  519 1,243  60 30 1,240  
initiation 103,717 6,292 6.1%  675 1,196 530 0 138 3,753  
reinitiation 40,354 30,644 75.9%  5,521 4,414 18,170 2,082  457  
added by 2007  19,755   6,501 2,980 2,750 6,993 531   
all signals 280,567 67,119 23.9%  13,287 9,979 22,490 9,181 787 11,395  
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 Orig. tape All changes  Trading signal according to adjusted 2007 tape   
Trading signal as of original tape No. No. %  downgrade upgrade reiteration initiation reinitiation deleted  
Panel D: Migrations in trading signals (2003 tape vs. 2007 tape) 
downgrade 79,462 4,005 5.0%   15 553 12 11 3,414  
upgrade 62,097 3,208 5.2%  63  542 11 7 2,585  
reiteration 22,267 5,254 23.6%  1,596 1,273  61 14 2,310  
initiation 111,889 4,406 3.9%  434 7 17 0 15 3,933  
reinitiation 56,430 44,948 79.7%  11,274 5,017 24,584 2,419  1,654  
added by 2007  5,492   1,442 1,444 937 1,544 125   
all signals  332,145 67,313 20.3%  14,809 7,756 26,633 4,047 172 13,896  
Panel E: Migrations in trading signals (2004 tape vs. 2007 tape) 
downgrade 111,046 26,602 24.0%   15 605 6 1 25,975  
upgrade 93,993 27,344 29.1%  48  576 3 3 26,714  
reiteration 35,847 16,278 45.4%  1,982 1,606  53 7 12,630  
initiation 143,923 28,865 20.1%  450 13 34 0 17 28,351  
reinitiation 65,416 52,357 80.0%  13,274 6,004 27,723 2,949  2,407  
added by 2007  4,381   817 1,388 670 1,391 115   
all signals 450,225 155,827 34.6%  16,571 9,026 29,608 4,402 143 96,077  
Panel F: Migrations in trading signals (2005 tape vs. 2007 tape) 
downgrade 102,734 2,045 2.0%   12 567 6 2 1,458  
upgrade 82,477 1,622 2.0%  14  537 0 1 1,070  
reiteration 27,135 4,012 14.8%  1,767 1,657  43 9 536  
initiation 130,848 1,276 1.0%  3 2 4 0 0 1,267  
reinitiation 71,687 55,847 77.9%  14,099 6,792 31,538 3,214  204  
added by 2007  1,889   591 495 268 453 82   
all signals 414,881 66,691 16.1%  16,474 8,958 32,914 3,716 94 4,535  
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Table V. Effect of Changes on the Abnormal Returns to Upgrades and Downgrades. 
This table compares the abnormal returns to upgrades and downgrades for the 2004 and 2007 I/B/E/S tapes using two 
different approaches. Panel A reports average daily percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns for simple calendar-time 
portfolios based on portfolios of upgrades and downgrades. Diffret is average daily return difference between the 2004 
portfolio (Ret04) and the corresponding 2007 portfolio (Ret07). DiffXret is the average excess return difference between the 
same 2004 and 2007 portfolios. Excess returns are equal to the intercept from a regression of Diffret (less the riskfree rate) on 
(i) the excess of the market return over the risk-free rate, (ii) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted 
portfolio of small stocks and one of large stocks (SMB), (iii) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted 
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks (HML), and (iv) the difference between the 
daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high price momentum stocks and one of low price momentum stocks (UMD). 
Column (1) reports the average daily returns for the entire sample period over which the 2004 and 2007 tapes overlap (Oct. 
29, 1993 to Mar. 18, 2004); columns (2) and (3) report the average daily returns for the “post-bubble” period (i.e., the period 
subsequent to Mar. 10, 2000, the date of the NASDAQ market peak) and the “pre-bubble” period (the period prior to Mar. 
10, 2000). Columns (4)-(6) are defined similarly for downgrades. Panels B and C report differences in the three-day event-
time returns between the 2004 and 2007 tapes for upgrades and downgrades, respectively. The column labeled “2to1” refers 
to upgrades from I/B/E/S recommendation code 2 (i.e., “buy”) to I/B/E/S code 1 (i.e., “strong buy”) only; other columns are 
defined analogously. ERet04 and ERet07 are the three-day raw event returns, calculated as the geometrically cumulated 
return for the day before, day of, and day after the recommendation, using data from the 2004 and 2007 tapes, respectively. 
DiffEret then equals the average difference between ERet04 and ERet07. Analogously, we compute the three-day excess 
event return as the raw stock return less the appropriate size-decile return of the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index (not 
shown for brevity) and report DiffEXret, the average difference between the three-day excess return samples. t-statistics are in 
parentheses, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold typeface.  
 
 
Panel A: Daily calendar-time portfolio returns (in %): 2004 versus 2007 tapes 
 Upgrades  Downgrades 
 Full period 
(1) 
Post- 
“bubble” 
(2) 
Pre- 
“bubble” 
(3) 
 Full period 
(4) 
Post- 
“bubble” 
(5) 
Pre- 
“bubble” 
(6) 
        
Ret07 0.161 0.191 0.142  -0.095 -0.141 -0.065 
 (6.76) 
 
(3.89) 
 
(6.06) 
  
(-3.68) 
 
(-2.51) 
 
(-2.93) 
 
Ret04 0.148 0.159 0.142  -0.078 -0.101 -0.063 
 (6.37) 
 
(3.36) 
 
(6.02) 
  
(-3.10) 
 
(-1.87) 
 
(-2.79) 
 
Diffret 0.012 0.032 -0.000  -0.017 -0.040 -0.002 
 (3.65) 
 
(3.99) 
 
(-0.01) 
  
(-4.88) 
 
(-4.85) 
 
(-1.10) 
 
DiffXret 0.013 0.036 0.000  -0.016 -0.040 -0.002 
 (3.90) 
 
(4.58) 
 
(0.22) 
  
(-4.70) 
 
(-4.89) 
 
(-1.00) 
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Table V. Continued. 
 
 
 
Panel B: Three-day upgrade event returns (in %): 2004 versus 2007 tapes 
 
All         Upgrades to strong buy        Upgrades to buy     … to hold  to sell 
 upgrades 2to1 3to1 4to1 5to1 3to2 4to2 5to2 4to3 5to3 5to4 
            
ERet07 3.016 
(82.91) 
3.040 
(44.36) 
3.068 
(41.12) 
3.061 
(4.21) 
1.836 
(4.19) 
3.097 
(53.46) 
4.524 
(6.38) 
1.272 
(1.90) 
2.740 
(14.92) 
2.118 
(11.33) 
0.885 
(1.39) 
 
ERet04 
 
2.304 
 
2.853 
 
2.997 
 
1.971 
 
1.475 
 
2.366 
 
1.961 
 
0.398 
 
1.054 
 
1.698 
 
0.130 
 (78.47) 
 
(46.10) 
 
(42.04) 
 
(4.56) 
 
(4.21) 
 
(50.31) 
 
(7.22) 
 
(1.12) 
 
(14.11) 
 
(10.87) 
 
(0.89) 
 
DiffEret 0.712 
(15.37) 
0.187 
(2.03) 
0.071 
(0.69) 
1.090 
(1.29) 
0.361 
(0.64) 
0.731 
(9.90) 
2.563 
(3.37) 
0.875 
(1.17) 
1.686 
(9.93) 
0.420 
(1.74) 
0.755 
(1.21) 
 
DiffEXret 
 
0.724 
 
0.204 
 
0.093 
 
1.180 
 
0.518 
 
0.686 
 
2.828 
 
0.577 
 
1.850 
 
0.474 
 
0.657 
 (15.63) (2.25) (0.90) (1.40) (0.88) (9.28) (3.36) (0.79) (10.69) (1.90) (1.05) 
Panel C: Three-day downgrade event returns (in %): 2004 versus 2007 tapes 
 
All 
down-       Downgrades from strong buy      Downgrades from buy     … from hold  
 
from  
sell 
 grades 1to2 1to3 1to4 1to5 2to3 2to4 2to5 3to4 3to5 4to5 
            
ERet07 -4.720 
(-103.34) 
-4.045 
(-53.20) 
-5.342 
(-53.01) 
-6.079 
(-6.31) 
-4.680 
(-6.47) 
-4.925 
(-70.20) 
-6.531 
(-10.95) 
-3.441 
(-3.65) 
-4.130 
(-13.67) 
-3.851 
(-16.07) 
-0.584 
(-0.55) 
 
ERet04 
 
-3.794 
 
-3.756 
 
-5.169 
 
-5.425 
 
-3.352 
 
-4.102 
 
-3.018 
 
-1.278 
 
-1.387 
 
-2.868 
 
0.177 
 (-99.21) 
 
(-51.39) 
 
(-54.49) 
 
(-9.03) 
 
(-5.43) 
 
(-68.11) 
 
(-10.03) 
 
(-2.52) 
 
(-11.21) 
 
(-14.82) 
 
(0.97) 
 
DiffEret -0.926 
(-15.66) 
-0.289 
(-2.74) 
-0.173 
(-1.25) 
-0.654 
(-0.60) 
-1.328 
(-1.40) 
-0.823 
(-8.95) 
-3.513 
(-5.81) 
-2.163 
(-2.20) 
-2.743 
(-10.00) 
-0.983 
(-3.23) 
-0.761 
(-0.70) 
 
DiffEXret 
 
-0.890 
 
-0.263 
 
-0.241 
 
-0.991 
 
-1.191 
 
-0.754 
 
-3.175 
 
-2.169 
 
-2.776 
 
-0.958 
 
-0.887 
 (-14.74) (-2.50) (-1.48) (-0.85) (-1.16) (-8.09) (-4.90) (-2.14) (-9.46) (-3.01) (-0.76) 
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Table VI. Effect of Alterations, Additions, and Deletions on Consensus Trading Strategies. 
This table reports daily portfolio returns (in %) for a trading strategy (“spread”) based on changes in consensus analyst 
recommendations. We use all I/B/E/S recommendations that have been outstanding for less than one year. The consensus 
recommendation for a ticker equals the mean outstanding recommendation at the end of a calendar day, based on a 
minimum of three recommendations. Firms are grouped into quintiles at the beginning of the next day based on the 
change in consensus. Results are similar with monthly rebalancing. We compute daily portfolio returns by buying stocks 
in the highest consensus change quintile (Q5) and shorting stocks in the lowest consensus change quintile (Q1). Daily 
Daniel et al. (1997, “DGTW”) characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw portfolio returns minus the returns on a 
value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and one-year momentum 
quintiles. The strategy is performed separately on the 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007 tapes, and differences across 
tapes are reported. We split the sample into two sub-periods, 1993-2000 (“pre-2001”) and 2001 to the end of a tape’s time 
window (“2001-onward”). In the latter case, the exact sample period for the 2007 comparison tape extends from Jan. 1, 
2001 to the end of the tape in question, so the estimates for the 2007 tape shown in columns (3) and (7) are different for 
each comparison. t-statistics are in parentheses, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold typeface. 
 
 Pre-2001  2001-onwards 
 
Spread 
(Q5-Q1) 
in raw 
portfolio 
return 
Spread 
(Q5-Q1) 
in 
DGTW 
adjusted 
returns 
Spread 
(Q5-Q1) 
in 
DGTW 
returns, 
2007 
tape 
Difference 
in DGTW 
spread: 
2007 
minus 
200(X)  
Spread 
(Q5-Q1) 
in raw 
portfolio 
return 
Spread 
(Q5-Q1) 
in 
DGTW 
adjusted 
returns 
Spread 
(Q5-Q1) 
in 
DGTW 
returns, 
2007 
tape 
Difference 
in DGTW 
spread: 
2007 
minus 
200(X) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
2002 tape 0.272 0.266 0.269 0.003  0.477 0.427 0.364 -0.062 
 (9.76) (9.50) (10.64) (0.04)  (8.01) (7.22) (6.09) (2.10) 
2003 tape 0.292 0.289 0.269 -0.020  0.406 0.383 0.386 0.003 
 (12.69) (11.26) (10.64) (-2.26)  (8.01) (7.80) (8.610 (0.11) 
2004 tape 0.294 0.29 0.269 -0.021  0.428 0.365 0.409 0.044 
 (12.72) (11.21) (10.64) (-2.23)  (10.91) (8.830 (10.78) (1.50) 
2005 tape 0.289 0.288 0.269 -0.019  0.476 0.429 0.426 -0.003 
 (12.42) (11.22) (10.64) (-2.54)  (15.34) (13.95) (13.94) (-0.36) 
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Table VII. Effect of Changes on Persistence in Individual Analyst Performance. 
The table reports tests of persistence in individual analysts’ stock-picking skills. Tests are performed separately on the 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007 tapes. Persistence is measured by the returns to a strategy that goes long stocks 
recommended by analysts with a history of making recommendations that lead to profitable trades and that goes short stocks 
recommended by analysts with a history of making recommendations that lead to unprofitable trades. Specifically, we rank 
analysts into quintiles in Jan. and July of each year, based on the average five-day DGTW-adjusted returns for each of their 
recommendations issued during the previous six calendar months. Daily DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as 
raw returns minus the returns on a value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-
book, and one-year momentum quintile. The “persistence spread” then equals the difference between the average five-day 
DGTW-adjusted return of recommendations issued by analysts in the highest quintile (Q5) minus the average five-day 
DGTW-adjusted return of recommendations issued by analysts in the lowest quintile (Q1), in each case computed over the 
following six months. The five-day return is the geometrically cumulated DGTW-adjusted return for the two trading days 
before through the two trading days after the recommendation. We assume that we buy on positive recommendations and sell 
on negative recommendations. In Panel A, we report persistence spreads for each I/B/E/S tape from 2000 through 2005 
(shown in column (1)) and for the 2007 tape (shown in column (2)). Note that each tape is compared over its full available 
sample period to the 2007 tape, so the estimates for the 2007 tape shown in column (2) are different for each comparison 
tape. In column (3), we report differences between each tape and the 2007 tape. t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and 5% 
statistical significance is indicated in bold typeface. The results in Panel B are computed identically to those in Panel A, 
except that we impose an all-star filter. Specifically, we restrict quintile 5 to be the subset of quintile 5 analysts who are also 
all-star analysts (as designated in the preceding Oct. issue of Institutional Investor magazine), and we restrict quintile 1 to be 
the subset of quintile 1 analysts who are not also all-star analysts.  
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Average five-day event returns (in %) from persistence quintiles 
 
Persistence 
spread 
(Q5-Q1) 
(1) 
Persistence 
spread (Q5-Q1) from
2007 tape 
(2) 
Difference 
in persistence  
spreads, 
2007-200X 
(3) 
 
2000 tape 
 
 
2001 tape 
2.432 
(5.62) 
 
2.960 
2.480 
(8.14) 
 
2.574 
0.047  
(0.21) 
 
-0.386 
 
(8.13) (9.21) (-3.40) 
2002 tape 3.079 2.556  -0.523 
 
(7.75) (9.68) (-2.22) 
2003 tape 2.673 2.490  -0.183 
 
(9.14) (9.65) (-1.65) 
2004 tape 2.645 2.461  -0.184 
 (9.95) (10.49) (-2.18) 
2005 tape 2.561 2.444  -0.118 
 
 
(11.07) (11.76) (-1.86) 
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Table VII. Continued. 
 
 
Panel B: Average five-day event returns (in %) from persistence quintiles 
with all-star screens included 
 
Persistence 
spread 
(Q5-Q1) 
(1) 
Persistence 
spread (Q5-Q1) from
2007 tape 
(2) 
Difference 
in persistence  
spreads, 
2007-200X 
(3) 
 
2000 tape 
 
 
2001 tape 
3.049 
(4.61) 
 
4.059 
 
3.158 
(7.60) 
 
3.239 
  
0.109 
(0.22) 
 
-0.820 
 
(9.32) (8.74) (-2.80) 
2002 tape 3.811 3.149  -0.663 
 
(9.11) (8.72) (-2.57) 
2003 tape 3.404 3.038  -0.366 
 
(10.01) (8.46) (-1.94) 
2004 tape 3.131 2.964  -0.168 
 (9.32) (9.03) (-1.07) 
2005 tape 2.991 2.897 -0.094 
 
 
(10.43) (9.94) (-0.82) 
